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Learning Ontologies with Epistemic Reasoning:
The EL Case
Ana Ozaki and Nicolas Troquard
KRDB Research Centre, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Abstract. We investigate the problem of learning description logic on-
tologies from entailments via queries, using epistemic reasoning. We in-
troduce a new learning model consisting of epistemic membership and
example queries and show that polynomial learnability in this model co-
incides with polynomial learnability in Angluin’s exact learning model
with membership and equivalence queries. We then instantiate our learn-
ing framework to EL and show some complexity results for an epistemic
extension of EL where epistemic operators can be applied over the axioms.
Finally, we transfer known results for EL ontologies and its fragments to
our learning model based on epistemic reasoning.
1 Introduction
Description logics (DL) balance expressivity and complexity of reasoning, result-
ing in a family of formalisms which can capture conceptual knowledge in various
domains [3]. One of the most popular ontology languages, featuring polynomial
time complexity of reasoning tasks such as entailment, is EL [2], which allows
conjunctions (⊓) and existential restrictions (∃) in its concept expressions but
disallows negations of concepts. The following example illustrates EL ontologies
(Section 4) representing knowledge of experts in different domains.
Example 1. Ana knows about Brazilian music (BM) and Nicolas is an expert in
French cuisine (FC). We can represent some parts of their knowledge as follows.
OBMAna = {BrazilianSinger(Caetano) O
FC
Nicolas = {FrenchChef(Soyer)
BossaNova ⊑ BrazilianMusicStyle Crepe ⊑ ∃contains.Flour
ViolaBuriti ⊑ ∃madeFrom.Buriti} Crepe ⊓ ∃contains.Sugar ⊑ Dessert}
Naturally, domain experts—humans, or artificial entities with complex neu-
ral networks—cannot be expected to be able to easily transfer their knowledge.
However, when specific questions about the domain are posed, e.g., ‘is Bossa
Nova a Brazilian music style?’, an expert in the domain of Brazilian music can
accurately decide whether such statement holds or not. So the ontology rep-
resentation of the knowledge of an expert, even though not directly accessible,
can be learned via a trial and error process in which individuals or machines,
generically called agents, communicate with each other, in order to learn from
the other agents. We assume that the target domain of interest to be learned is
represented by a logical theory formulated in an ontology language.
2In computational learning theory, a classical communication protocol coming
from the exact learning model [1] is based on questions of two types: member-
ship and equivalence queries. In a learning from entailments setting [12], these
questions can be described as follows. Membership queries correspond to asking
whether a certain statement formulated as a logical sentence follows from the
target. Equivalence queries correspond to asking whether a certain logical theory,
called hypothesis, precisely describes the target. If there are wrong or missing
statements in the hypothesis, a statement illustrating the imprecision should be
returned to the agent playing the role of the learner.
Example 2. Assume Ana wants to learn about French cuisine. She asks Nicolas
whether it follows from his knowledge that ‘every crepe is a dessert’, in symbols,
‘does OFCNicolas |= Crepe ⊑ Dessert?’, which the answer in this case is ‘no’, since only
those which contain sugar are considered desserts. To receive new statements
about French cuisine from Nicolas, Ana needs to pose equivalence queries, in
symbols ‘does OFCAna ≡ O
FC
Nicolas?’. Each time she poses this type of questions, her
best interest is to tell him everything she knows about French cuisine.
One of the main difficulties in implementing this protocol in practice [18, page
297] comes from the putative unreasonableness of equivalence queries. Whenever
a learner poses an equivalence query, the expert playing the role of an oracle
needs to evaluate the whole hypothesis and decide whether or not it is equivalent
to the target. If not, then the oracle returns a statement in the logical difference
between the hypothesis and the target. One way out of this difficulty is hinted
to us by a simple observation: during interactive communication among agents,
not only domain knowledge is exchanged and acquired but also second-order
knowledge, which is the knowledge of what is known by the other agents.
Example 3. When Ana and Nicolas communicate, they know what they have
already told to each other. If Ana tells Nicolas that ‘Buriti is a Brazilian tree’
(Nicolas now knows this statement, in symbols, KNicolas(Buriti ⊑ BrazilianTree))
and that ‘Viola de Buriti is made from Buriti’ (KNicolas(ViolaBuriti ⊑
∃madeFrom.Buriti)) she does not need to tell him that ‘Viola de Buriti is made
from a Brazilian tree’ (as it follows that KNicolas(ViolaBuriti ⊑
∃madeFrom.BrazilianTree), see Section 4).
In this paper, we thus propose a new and more realistic learning model. It
is based on a protocol which takes into account what is known by the agents,
either because a statement was explicitly communicated or because it is a logical
consequence of previous statements given during their interaction. Our protocol
is based on queries of two types. The first is an epistemic version of membership
queries where the oracle ‘remembers’ those membership queries whose reply was
‘yes’. We call the second type example queries. When asked an example query, the
oracle answers a statement which follows from its knowledge but does not follow
from its knowledge about what the learner knows. The oracle also ‘remembers’
that the statements given are now known by the learner.
The first contribution of this work is the introduction of the learning model
based on epistemic reasoning, which we call epistemic learning model, and an
3EPISTEMIC[MEM,EX]
Th. 3
= EXACT[MEM,EQ]
[18] and [5]
⊂ PAC[MEM]
EPISTEMIC[EX]
Th. 1 and Th. 2
⊂ EXACT[EQ]
[1] and [5]
⊂ PAC
Fig. 1. Polynomial learnability. Each class denotes the set of frameworks that are
polynomial query learnable in the corresponding learning model. MEM, EQ and EX
stand for membership, equivalence, and example queries respectively.
analysis of its ‘power’ in comparison with the exact learning model (Figure 1).
The second is an instantiation to the EL ontology language, whose polynomial
learnability has been investigated in the exact learning model [11, 15, 16].
In more details, the epistemic learning model is introduced in Section 2. We
then establish in Section 3 that polynomial learnability is strictly harder in the
epistemic model without (an epistemic version of) membership queries (Theo-
rems 1 and 2). Nonetheless, it coincides with polynomial learnability in the exact
learning model if both types of queries are allowed (Theorem 3). Since it is known
that polynomial learnability in the exact learning model with only equivalence
queries implies polynomial learnability in the classical probably approximately
correct learning model (PAC) [1,19], it follows that polynomial learnability in the
epistemic learning model with only example queries implies polynomial learnabil-
ity in the PAC learning model. The same relationship holds for the case where
we have (an epistemic version of) membership queries in the epistemic model
and the PAC model also allows membership queries. We also show in Section 4
some complexity results for an epistemic extension of EL, which we call ELK.
In particular, we show that satisfiability in ELK, which includes Boolean combi-
nations of EL axioms, does increase the NP-completeness of propositional logic
(Theorem 4). We then show that a fragment of ELK features PTime complexity
for the satisfiability and entailment problems (Theorem 5), as in EL [2]. Crucially,
it captures the epistemic reasoning that the agent playing the role of the oracle
needs to perform. Finally, in Section 5 we transfer known results [11, 15] for EL
in the exact learning model to the epistemic learning model.
2 Learning with epistemic reasoning
We first define the epistemic extension of a description logic L, which is often
a notation variant of a fragment of first-order logic or propositional logic. The
epistemic extension of L allows expressions of the form ‘agent i knows some
axiom of L’. We then use the epistemic extension of a logic to define a learning
framework based on epistemic reasoning.
42.1 The epistemic extension of L
In the following, we formalise the epistemic extension LK of a description logic L.
Our notation and definitions can be easily adapted to the case L is a (fragment of)
first-order or propositional logic. Assume symbols of L are taken from pairwise
disjoint and countably infinite sets of concept, role and individual names NC, NR
and NI, respectively. Let A be a set of agents. An LK axiom is an expression of
the form: β ::= α | Kiβ where α is an L formula and i ∈ A. LK formulas ϕ, ψ
are expressions of the form: ϕ ::= β | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ where β is an LK axiom.
An L interpretation I = (∆I , ·I) over a non-empty set∆I , called the domain,
defines an interpretation function ·I that maps each concept name A ∈ NC to a
subset AI of ∆I , each role name r ∈ NR to a binary relation rI on ∆I , and each
individual name a ∈ NI to an element aI ∈ ∆I . The extension of the mapping ·I
from concept names to L complex concept expressions depends on the precise
definition of L. We write |=L and ≡L to denote the entailment and equivalence
relations for L formulas, respectively.
An LK interpretation I = (W , {Ri}i∈A) consists of a set W of L interpre-
tations and a set of accessibility relations Ri on W , one for each agent i ∈ A.
We assume that the relations Ri are equivalence relations. A pointed LK in-
terpretation is a pair (I, I) where I = (W , {Ri}i∈A) is an LK interpretation
and I is an element of W . The entailment relation |=LK of an LK formula ϕ
in I = (W , {Ri}i∈A) pointed at I ∈ W is inductively defined (for simplicity, we
may omit the subscript LK from |=LK):
I, I |= α iff I |=L α I, I |= φ ∧ ψ iff I, I |= φ and I, I |= ψ
I, I |= ¬φ iff not I, I |= φ I, I |= Kiβ iff ∀(I,J ) ∈ Ri, J |= β.
An LK formula ϕ entails an LK formula ψ, written ϕ |= ψ, iff for all pointed
LK interpretations (I, I), I, I |= ϕ implies I, I |= ψ. An LK formula ϕ is
equivalent to an LK formula ψ, written ϕ ≡ ψ (we may omit LK from ≡LK), iff
ϕ |= ψ and ψ |= ϕ. We use the notion of a set of formulas and the conjunction
of its elements interchangeably. The size of a formula or an interpretation X ,
denoted |X |, is the length of the string that represents it, where concept, role
and individual names and domain elements are considered to be of length 1.
2.2 A learning model based on epistemic reasoning
We first adapt the exact learning model with membership and equivalence queries
to a multi-agent setting. We then introduce the epistemic learning model in a
multi-agent setting and provide complexity notions for these models.
We introduce basic notions for the definition of a learning framework and
the learning problem via queries [1], adapted to a learning from entailments
setting [12] with multiple agents. A learning (from entailments) framework F
is a pair (X,L), where X is a set of examples (also called domain or instance
space), and L is a set of formulas of a description logic L. We say that x ∈ X is
a positive example for l ∈ L if l |=L x and a negative example for l if l 6|=L x. A
5counterexample x for l ∈ L and h ∈ L is either a positive example for l such that
h 6|=L x or a negative example for l such that h |=L x. A multi-agent learning
framework F(A) is a set {Fi = (Xi, Li) | i ∈ A} of learning frameworks.
We first provide a formal definition of the exact learning model, based on
membership and equivalence queries, and then we introduce the epistemic learn-
ing model, with example and epistemic membership queries. Let F(A) be a
multi-agent learning framework. Each i ∈ A aims at learning a target formula
lj ∈ Lj of a description logic L of each other agent j 6= i ∈ A by posing them
queries.
Definition 1 (Membership query). For every i ∈ A and every li ∈ Li, let
MEMF(A),li be an oracle that takes as input x ∈ Xi and outputs ‘yes’ if li |=L x
and ‘no’ otherwise. A membership query to agent i ∈ A is a call to MEMF(A),li .
Definition 2 (Equivalence query). For every i ∈ A and every li ∈ Li, we
denote by EQF(A),li an oracle that takes as input a hypothesis formula of a
description logic h ∈ Li and returns ‘yes’ if h ≡L li and a counterexample for
li and h otherwise. An equivalence query to agent i ∈ A is a call to EQF(A),li .
There is no assumption about which counterexample is returned by EQF(A),li .
In this work, we introduce example queries, where an agent i ∈ A can ask
an agent j ∈ A to only provide examples which are not logical consequences of
what they have already communicated. Intuitively, if agent j returns x to agent
i in a language L and x |=L y then agent i knows y, in symbols,Kiy. Since agent
j returned this example to agent i, the axiom Kiy is part of the logical theory
representing the knowledge of agent j, so agent j acquires knowledge of what is
known by agent i as they communicate. We use example queries in combination
with an epistemic version of membership queries, called K-membership queries.
Given i ∈ A, assume that Li is a set of formulas of the logic L and denote by
LKi the set of all formulas in the epistemic extension of L, which, by definition of
LK, includes all L formulas. The target formula li is an element of Li, however,
the oracles for the example and K-membership queries may add LK formulas
to li. We denote by l
k+1
i the result of updating l
k
i upon receiving the k-th query,
where l1i = li. At all times Xi is a set of examples in L (not in LK).
Definition 3 (K-membership query). For every i ∈ A and every lki ∈ L
K
i ,
let MEMK
F(A),lk
i
be an oracle that takes as input x ∈ Xi and j ∈ A, and, if
l1i |=L x, it outputs ‘yes’ and define l
k+1
i := l
k
i ∧Kjx
1.
Otherwise it returns ‘no’ and defines lk+1i := l
k
i . The k-th K-membership
query to agent i ∈ A is a call to MEMK
F(A),lk
i
.
Definition 4 (Example query). For every i ∈ A and every lki ∈ L
K
i , let
EXF(A),lk
i
be an oracle that takes as input some j ∈ A and outputs x ∈ Xi such
that l1i |=L x but l
k
i 6|=LK Kjx if such x exists; or ‘you finished’, otherwise.
Upon returning x ∈ Xi such that l1i |=L x the oracle EXF(A),lk
i
defines lk+1i :=
lki ∧Kjx. The k-th example query to agent i ∈ A is a call to EXF(A),lk
i
.
1 We may write lki for the conjunction of its elements.
6An exact learning algorithm Ai for Fi ∈ F(A) is a deterministic algorithm
that takes no input, is allowed to make queries to MEMF(A),li and EQF(A),li
(without knowing what the target li to be learned is), and eventually halts and
outputs some h ∈ Li with h ≡L li. An epistemic learning algorithm for Fi ∈ F(A)
is a deterministic algorithm that takes no input, is allowed to make queries to
MEMK
F(A),lk
i
and EXF(A),lk
i
(without knowing what the target l1i to be learned
is), and eventually halts after receiving ‘you finished’ from EXF(A),lk
i
.
We say that F(A) is exactly learnable if there is an exact learning algorithm
Ai for each Fi ∈ F(A) and that F(A) is polynomial query exactly learnable if each
Fi ∈ F(A) is exactly learnable by an algorithm Ai such that at every step the
sum of the sizes of the inputs to queries made by Ai up to that step is bounded by
a polynomial p(|li|, |x|), where li is the target and x ∈ Xi is the largest example
seen so far by Ai. F(A) is polynomial time exactly learnable if each Fi ∈ F(A) is
exactly learnable by an algorithm Ai such that at every step (we count each call
to an oracle as one step of computation) of computation the time used by Ai up
to that step is bounded by a polynomial p(|li|, |x|), where li ∈ Li is the target
and x ∈ X is the largest counterexample seen so far. We may also say that F(A)
is learnable in O(|li|, |x|) many steps, following the same notion of polynomial
time learnability, except that the number of steps is bounded by O(|li|, |x|).
We say that F(A) is epistemically learnable if there is an epistemic learning
algorithm for each Fi ∈ F(A). Polynomial query/time epistemic learnability is
defined analogously, with p(|l1i |, |x|) defined in terms of |l
1
i | and |x|. Clearly, if
a learning framework F(A) is polynomial time exactly/epistemically learnable
then it is also polynomial query exactly/epistemically learnable.
3 Epistemic and exact polynomial learnability
In this section we confront polynomial query and polynomial time learnability
in the exact and epistemic learning models. We start by considering the case
where the learner is only allowed to pose one type of query. Clearly, polyno-
mial (query/time) exact learnability with only membership queries coincides
with polynomial epistemic learnability with only K-membership queries. We
now analyse polynomial learnability with equivalence queries only and exam-
ple queries only. Our first result is that polynomial (query/time) learnability in
the epistemic learning model implies polynomial learnability in exact learning
model.
Theorem 1. If a multi-agent learning framework is polynomial query (resp.
time) epistemically learnable with only example queries then it is polynomial
query (resp. time) exactly learnable with only equivalence queries.
Proof. Assume F(A) is polynomial query epistemically learnable with only ex-
ample queries (the case of polynomial time epistemic learnability with only ex-
ample queries can be similarly proved). For each Fi ∈ F(A) there is an epistemic
learning algorithm Ai for Fi with polynomial query complexity which only asks
7example queries. To construct an exact learning algorithm A′i for Fi which only
asks equivalence queries using Ai, we define auxiliary sets s
K
i (k) and s
L
i (k) which
will keep the information returned by EQF(A),li up to the k-th query posed by
a fixed but arbitrary agent in A \ {i} and agent i. We define sKi (1) = ∅ and
sLi (1) = ∅.
– Whenever Ai poses an example query to agent i ∈ A (assume it is the k-th
query), A′i calls the oracle EQF(A),li with s
L
i (k) as input. The oracle either
returns ‘yes’ if sLi is equivalent to li or it returns some counterexample for
li and s
L
i (k) (we may write s
L
i (k) to denote
∧
β∈sL
i
(k) β). Then A
′
i adds Kjx
to sKi (k) and x to s
L
i (k).
If EQF(A),li returns ‘yes’ then algorithm A
′
i converts it into ‘you finished’, as
expected by algorithm Ai. We now argue that, for all x ∈ Xi and all k ≥ 0 such
that li |=L x, we have that x is a (positive) counterexample for li and sLi (k)
iff li ∧ sKi (k) 6|=LK Kjx. By definition of s
K
i (k) and s
L
i (k) and since li does not
contain LK axioms, for all x ∈ Xi and all k ≥ 0, we have that li∧sKi (k) |=LK Kjx
iff sLi (k) |=L x. By definition and construction of s
L
i (k), it follows that li |=L
sLi (k). So s
L
i (k) 6|=L x iff li ∧ s
K
i (k) 6|=LK Kjx. Hence EQF(A),li can simulate
EXF(A),lk
i
, where k represents the number of calls to EXF(A),lk
i
posed so far by
Ai. By definition of Ai, at every step, the sum of the sizes of the inputs to queries
made by Ai up to that step is bounded by a polynomial p(|li|, |x|), where li is
the target and x ∈ Xi is the largest counterexample seen so far by Ai. Then,
for all k ≥ 0, we have that |sLi (k)| ≤ |s
K
i (k)| ≤ p(|li|, |x|). Since all responses to
queries are as required by Ai, if Ai halts after polynomially many polynomial size
queries, the same happens with A′i, which returns a hypothesis s
L
i (k) equivalent
to the target li, for some k ≤ p(|li|, |x|).
The converse of Theorem 1 does not hold, as we show in the next theorem.
Theorem 2. There is a multi-agent learning framework F(A) such that F(A)
is polynomial time exactly learnable with only equivalence queries but not polyno-
mial query (so, not polynomial time) epistemically learnable with only example
queries.
Proof. Consider the learning framework F = (X,L) where X is the set of
propositional formulas over the variables Prop = {q, p, p01, . . . , p
0
n, p
1
1, . . . , p
1
n} and
L = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ X,ϕ ≡ (p → q)} (where ≡ denotes logical equivalence in proposi-
tional logic). So the target can only be a formula equivalent to p → q. Now let
F(A) be the set {Fi = (X,L) | i ∈ A}, with all learning frameworks are equal to
F (this does not mean that the target is the same for all agents but that they are
taken from the same set L). If L is a language which only contains propositional
formulas equivalent to p → q, an exact learning algorithm can learn the target
with only one equivalence query, passing the hypothesis {p→ q} as input. How-
ever, EXF(A),{p→q} can return any of the exponentially many examples of the
form p ∧ (pℓ11 ∧ . . . ∧ p
ℓn
n )→ q, with ℓj ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The example
oracle can always provide an example which does not follow from its knowledge
8of what is known by the learner by taking a fresh binary sequence. Thus, there
is no epistemic algorithm which can learn the target with polynomially many
queries.
Interestingly, if we consider both types of queries then polynomial exact learn-
ability coincides with polynomial epistemic learnability.
Theorem 3. Let F(A) be a multi-agent learning framework. F(A) is polynomial
query (resp. time) exactly learnable if, and only if, F(A) is polynomial query
(resp. time) epistemically learnable.
Proof. (⇒) In our proof we use polynomial query exact learnability, the ar-
gument for polynomial time exact learnability is analogous. Assume F(A) is
polynomial query exactly learnable. Then, for each Fi ∈ F(A) there is an exact
learning algorithm Ai for Fi. We construct an epistemic learning algorithm A
′
i
for Fi using Ai as follows. Recall that we write l
k
i to denote the target l
k
i after
the k-th query (Section 2.2).
– Whenever Ai poses a membership query to agent i ∈ A with x ∈ Xi as
input, A′i calls MEM
K
F(A),lk
i
with x as input, where k represents the number
of queries posed so far by A′i.
– Whenever Ai poses an equivalence query to agent i ∈ A with a hypothesis h
as input, we have that, for each x ∈ h, A′i calls MEM
K
F(A),lk
i
with x as input
(and k is incremented). Then, the algorithm calls the oracle EXF(A),lk
i
.
MEMKF(A),li behaves as it is required by algorithm Ai to learn Fi. We show that
whenever EXF(A),lk
i
returns some x ∈ Xi we have that x is a counterexample for
l1i and h, where h is the input of the equivalence query posed by Ai. By definition
of Ai, at every step, the sum of the sizes of the inputs to queries made by Ai up
to that step is bounded by a polynomial p(|l1i |, |x|), where l
1
i is the target and
x ∈ Xi is the largest example seen so far by Ai. Let h
ℓ denote the input to the
ℓ-th equivalence query posed by Ai. For all ℓ > 0, we have that |hℓ| ≤ p(|l1i |, |x|).
The fact that x is a counterexample for l1i and h
ℓ follows from the definition of
A′i, which poses membership queries for each x ∈ h
ℓ, ensuring that lki is updated
with Kjx after each query. Hence EXF(A),lk
i
returns counterexamples for l1i and
hℓ (if they exist), as EQF(A),l1
i
. Since Ai poses only polynomially many queries,
ℓ is bounded by p(|l1i |, |x|). So the sum of the sizes of the inputs to queries made
by the epistemic learning algorithm A′i simulating Ai is quadratic in p(|l
1
i |, |x|).
All in all, since all responses to queries are as required by Ai, if Ai halts and
outputs some h ∈ Li with h ≡L l1i (with h the input to the last equivalence
query) after polynomially many polynomial size queries, we have that EXF(A),l1
i
is forced to return ‘you finished’ and so A′i also halts after polynomially many
polynomial size queries. The (⇐) direction is similar to the proof of Theorem 1,
except that we now also have (K-)membership queries.
94 The epistemic EL description logic
To instantiate the multi-agent epistemic learning problem to the EL case, in
Section 5, we define and study in this section the epistemic extension of EL,
called ELK. We present EL [3] in Section 4.1. ELK is the instantiation of LK
presented in Section 2.1 with the logic EL. We establish the complexity of the
satisfiability problem for ELK in Section 4.2 and of one of its fragments in
Section 4.3.
We showed in Section 3 that example queries give strictly less power to
the learner than equivalence queries. We also argued, quite informally so far,
that example queries are less demanding on the oracle than equivalence queries.
Instead of deciding whether two ontologies are equivalent, and then providing a
counterexample when it is not the case, the oracle only needs to reason about
what they know about the knowledge of the learner. Yet, we did not say anything
about the actual complexity of the epistemic reasoning involved in example
queries. If reasoning about the knowledge of the learner is harder than evaluating
the equivalence of two ontologies, then the advantage of example queries for the
oracle would be moot. We show that indeed the epistemic reasoning that the
oracle needs to perform is in PTime (Theorem 5). So, the oracle’s benefit from
example queries over equivalence queries is a net benefit.
4.1 EL: syntax, semantics, and complexity
EL concepts C,D are expressions of the form: C,D ::= ⊤ | A | ∃r.C | C⊓D where
A ∈ NC and r ∈ NR. An inclusion is an expression of the form C ⊑ D where
C,D are EL concept expressions; and an assertion is of the form A(a) or r(a, b)
with a, b ∈ NI, A ∈ NC, and r ∈ NR. An EL axiom is an inclusion or an assertion.
An EL formula2 is an expression of the form α ::= a | ¬α | α∧α where a is an EL
axiom. An EL literal is an EL axiom or its negation. The semantics of EL is given
by L interpretations I = (∆I , ·I) as defined in Section 2.1, considering L = EL.
We extend the mapping ·I for EL complex concept expressions as follows:
⊤I := ∆I , (C ⊓D)I := CI ∩DI ,
(∃r.C)I := {d ∈ ∆I | ∃e ∈ CI : (d, e) ∈ rI}.
We now define the entailment relation |=EL for EL formulas. Given an EL in-
terpretation I and an EL axiom (which can be an inclusion or an assertion,
as above) we define: I |=EL C ⊑ D iff CI ⊆ DI ; I |=EL A(a) iff aI ∈ AI ;
and I |=EL r(a, b) iff (aI , bI) ∈ rI . We inductively extend the relation |=EL to
EL formulas as in Section 2.1: I |=EL ϕ ∧ ψ iff I |=EL ϕ and I |=EL ψ; and
I |=EL ¬ϕ iff not I |=EL ϕ. In our proofs, we use the following result.
Lemma 1. Satisfiability of a conjunction of EL literals is PTime-complete [7].
2 Typically an EL ontology is a set of EL axioms [3], and can also be seen as a con-
junction of positive EL axioms. Here we also consider EL formulas, where we allow
negations and conjunctions over the axioms.
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We establish in Section 4.2 that reasoning about ELK formulas is NP-complete,
just like reasoning about EL formulas. We note that EL(K) formulas allow ar-
bitrary Boolean combinations of EL(K) axioms, hence the contrast with the
PTime complexity of entailment from an EL ontology [2]. In Section 4.3 we show
that reasoning about ELK restricted to conjunctions of literals is in PTime.
4.2 Reasoning in ELK
Here we study the complexity of the satisfiability problem in ELK. Our combi-
nation of epistemic logic and description logic is orthogonal to the work by De
Giacomo et. al [9]: while our epistemic operators are over EL formulas, the epis-
temic operators of the mentioned work are over concepts and roles. For instance,
there, KFrenchChef denotes the concept of known French chefs. Here, ELK con-
tains formulas such as Ki(FrenchChef(Soyer)) ∧ ¬KiKj(Crepe ⊑ ∃contains.Egg)
indicating that agent i knows that Soyer is a French chef, but i does not know
that j knows that crepes contain egg.
From the definition of the language of LK in Section 2.1, remember that the
language of ELK does not admit alternating modalities; E.g., Ki¬KjA(a) is not
a formula of ELK. It is rather easy to see that if there were no such syntactic
restrictions, the satisfiability problem would turn out to be PSpace-complete.
(We could reduce satisfiability and adapt the tableaus method of propositional
S5n [13].) Instead, we establish that satisfiability in ELK is NP-complete.
The lower bound follows from NP-hardness for propositional logic. The fol-
lowing lemma is central for showing membership in NP. It is a consequence of
the fact that EL and propositional logic have the polynomial size model property
and that in ELK the satisfiability test can be separated into two independent
tests: one for the DL dimension and one for the epistemic dimension (see [4,7]).
Lemma 2. ELK enjoys the polynomial size model property.
Since ELK formulas can be translated into first-order logic, for a fixed ELK
formula ϕ, checking whether a polynomial size interpretation is a model of ϕ can
be performed in NLogSpace. Thus, membership in NP is by the fact that, by
Lemma 2, one can guess a polynomial size model (if one exists) and check that
it is a model in NLogSpace ⊆ PTime.
Theorem 4. Satisfiability in ELK is NP-complete.
4.3 Reasoning in conjunctive ELK
We conclude this section considering the satisfiability problem for conjunctive
ELK, defined as the fragment of ELK which only allows negations in front of
EL axioms or in front of ELK axioms of the form Kα, with α a conjunction
of EL literals and K a non-empty sequence of epistemic operators. Formally,
conjunctive ELK formulas ϕ are expressions of the form: ϕ ::= α | β | ¬β | ϕ∧ϕ
with β ::=Kiα | Kiβ, and α ::= a | ¬a | α ∧ α, where a is an EL axiom.
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Algorithm 1 SAT (ϕ), deciding the satisfiability of conjunctive ELK formulas
Input: A conjunctive ELK formula ϕ
Output: TRUE if ϕ is satisfiable, and FALSE otherwise
1: if ω0 ∧
∧
{ω | Kσω ∈ ϕ
♭} is not EL satisfiable then
2: return FALSE
3: end if
4: for ¬Kσω ∈ ϕ
♭ do
5: ψ = ⊤ ∧
∧
{ω′ | Kσ′ω
′ ∈ ϕ♭, and σ is a subword of σ′}
6: MS = {ψ ∧ ¬β | β is an EL literal in ω}
7: if all conjunctions of EL literals in MS are not EL satisfiable then
8: return FALSE
9: end if
10: end for
11: return TRUE
To establish the complexity of reasoning in conjunctive ELK, we use the
following notation. For every non-empty sequence σ = a1 . . . ak ∈ A+ of agents,
we associate a sequence Kσ = Ka1 . . .Kak of epistemic operators. We write
β ∈ ψ if β is a conjunct occurring in ψ. We say that σ′ ∈ A+ is a subword of
σ ∈ A+ when σ′ is the result of removing zero or more elements from σ (at any
position of the sequence). Given a conjunctive ELK formula
ϕ = ω0 ∧Kσ1ωσ1 ∧ . . . ∧Kσnωσn ∧ ¬Kσn+1ωσn+1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Kσmωσm
where σi ∈ A
+, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and each ωi, with 0 ≤ i ≤ m, is a con-
junction of EL literals, we denote by ϕ♭ the formula resulting from exhaustively
substituting in ϕ every adjacent repetitions a . . . a of an agent a occurring in σi,
1 ≤ i ≤ m, with a. (E.g., a1a2a2a3a2 becomes a1a2a3a2.)
The following proposition is central to the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Proposition 1. A conjunctive ELK formula ϕ is unsatisfiable iff at least one
of the following properties holds:
1. ω0 ∧
∧
{ω | Kσω ∈ ϕ♭} is not EL satisfiable;
2. there is ¬Kσω ∈ ϕ
♭ such that ¬ω ∧
∧
{ω′ | Kσ′ω
′ ∈ ϕ♭, and σ
is a subword of σ′} is not EL satisfiable.
Proposition 1 suggests that the satisfiability of conjunctive ELK formulas
can be reduced to checking the satisfiability of a few conjunctions of EL literals.
We are finally ready to prove the complexity of deciding whether a conjunctive
ELK formula is satisfiable.
Theorem 5. Satisfiability in conjunctive ELK is PTime-complete.
Proof. Consider Algorithm 1. The conjunctive ELK formula ϕ is satisfiable iff
SAT (ϕ) returns TRUE. The correctness of the algorithm follows immediately
from Prop. 1. It suffices to observe that Lines 5–9 check the unsatisfiability of
an EL formula ¬ω ∧ ψ where ω and ψ are two of conjunctions of EL literals
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(¬ω ∧ ψ is not a conjunction of EL literals, unless ω contains only one literal)
by checking the unsatisfiability of as many conjunctions of EL literals ¬β ∧ψ as
there are literals β in ω. A simple analysis shows that the algorithm runs in time
polynomial in the size of ϕ, with a polynomial number of calls to a procedure for
checking the unsatisfiability of conjunctions of EL literals. By Lemma 1, each of
these checks can be done in polynomial time. Membership in PTime follows.
5 Learning EL with epistemic reasoning
It is known that EL ontologies are not polynomial query exactly learnable, while
the fragments of EL restricting one of the sides of inclusions to be a concept
name, namely ELlhs and ELrhs, are exactly learnable in polynomial time [15]. In
this section, we transfer results known for EL and its fragments to our learning
model. Our results are for learning frameworks where the learning language is
the same for all agents. That is, we deal with the special case of a multi-agent
learning framework F(A) = {Fi = (Xi, Li) | i ∈ A} where all formulas in all Li
are from a DL L, denoted F(L,A). Theorem 6 is a consequence of Theorem 3
and complexity results for EL and its fragments in the exact learning model [15].
Theorem 6. The learning framework F(EL,A) is not polynomial query epistem-
ically learnable. The learning frameworks F(ELlhs,A) and F(ELrhs,A) are poly-
nomial time epistemically learnable.
The hardness result for EL holds even for the fragment of EL ontologies
defined as the union of ELlhs and ELrhs, that is, in a named form where at least
one of the sides of concept inclusions is a concept name, which we call ELlhs,rhs.
An implementation of a learning algorithm for EL ontologies in this named form
was presented by Duarte et. al [10, 11]. The algorithm is exponential in the size
of the vocabulary ΣO of the ontology O (which is the set of concept/role and
individual names occurring in O) and the largest concept expression CO
3, but
it is not exponential in the size of the whole ontology.
Theorem 3 is not directly applicable in this case, however, we observe that if
the exact learning algorithm uses the epistemic learning model, then the outcome
of each example query will be a counterexample, and so, the complexity result
obtained with that algorithm is transferable to the epistemic setting. To see this,
consider Algorithm 2, which is an adaptation of the exact learning algorithm
for ELlhs,rhs [10, 11]. Assume F in Algorithm 2 is F(ELlhs,rhs,A). The number of
ΣO-assertions (defined as assertions with only symbols from ΣO) is polynomial
in the size of O, so, in Line 1, Algorithm 2 identifies those that occur in O using
K-membership queries. It follows that all examples returned by the oracle in
the ‘while’ loop are concept inclusions. In each iteration of the ‘while’ loop, the
algorithm uses the examples returned by the EXF(ELlhs,rhs,A),Ok oracle to compute
what is called ‘left O-essential’ and ‘rightO-essential’ concept inclusions usingK-
membership queries, and then updates the hypothesis with such inclusions. We
3 ‘The largest’ concept expression (and, later, counterexample) refers to the maximum
of the sizes of counterexamples/concept expressions.
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Algorithm 2 Adaptation of the learning algorithm for ELlhs,rhs [11]
Input: An EL terminology O given to the oracle; ΣO given to the learner
Output: An EL terminology H computed by the learner such that O ≡EL H
1: H := {a | MEMK
F,Ok
(a)=‘yes’, a is a ΣO-assertion or a = A ⊑ B, A,B ∈ ΣO}
2: while EXF,Ok 6= ‘you finished’ do
3: Let C ⊑ D be the returned positive example for O
4: Compute, with MEMK
F,Ok
, C′ ⊑ D′ such that C′ or D′ in ΣO ∩ NC
5: if C′ ∈ ΣO ∩ NC then
6: Compute with MEMK
F,Ok
a right O-essential a from C′ ⊑ D′ ⊓
d
C′⊑F ′∈H
F ′
7: else
8: Compute with MEMK
F,Ok
a left O-essential a from C′ ⊑ D′
9: end if
10: Add a to H
11: end while
12: return H
do not go into details of the algorithm, which is fully presented in the mentioned
reference, but point out that it only adds to its hypothesis concept inclusions
that follow from the target ontology O.
Since we use K-membership queries, the oracle is aware of the knowledge
obtained by the learner in this way and does not return examples which follow
from such entailments. With an inductive argument on the number of iterations
of the main loop of the algorithm one can show that, at each iteration, if the
learner asks for an example query instead of an equivalence query, the outcome
will indeed be a counterexample for O and H. So the number of membership and
equivalence queries is the same as the number of K-membership and example
queries. Moreover, the hypothesis H computed by Algorithm 2 is equivalent to
the target O (where O = O1, so without epistemic axioms). Our next theorem
formalises the fact that the number of queries performed by the exact learning
algorithm has the same bound in the epistemic learning framework.
Theorem 7. F(ELlhs,rhs,A) is epistemically learnable in O(|ΣO|♯O · (|C ⊑ D|)2)
many steps, where ♯O = 2 · |CO| · |ΣO|+ 2, CO is the largest concept expression
in O and C ⊑ D is the largest counterexample given by the oracle.
6 Discussion
We introduced the epistemic learning model and investigated polynomial learn-
ability in our model, establishing that it coincides with polynomial learnability
in the exact learning model, and as a consequence, we can also transfer results in
our model to the PAC learning model extended with membership queries. When
the learner is only allowed to pose example queries, we showed that polynomial
learnability in our model in strictly harder than in the exact learning model with
only equivalence queries. This suggests that example queries are less demand-
ing for the oracle than equivalence queries. We showed that, in the EL case, the
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epistemic reasoning that the oracle needs to perform features PTime complexity.
Our results complement previous research on polynomial learnability in the ex-
act and PAC learning models [8], where the authors analyse models between the
exact and PAC learning models, in a learning from interpretations setting. As
future work, we plan to investigate whether the implementation for ELlhs,rhs [11]
could benefit from our approach, where the oracle keeps track of the knowledge
passed to the learner, instead of processing the hypothesis at each iteration.
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A Proofs for Section 2
Theorem 3. Let F(A) be a multi-agent learning framework. F(A) is polynomial
query (resp. time) exactly learnable if, and only if, F(A) is polynomial query
(resp. time) epistemically learnable.
Proof. For completeness of our results we show in full detail the (⇐) direction
of this theorem. Now, assume F(A) is polynomial query epistemically learnable
(we skip the argument for polynomial time epistemic learnability as it is similar).
For each Fi ∈ F(A) there is an epistemic learning algorithm Ai for Fi with
polynomial query complexity. To construct an exact learning algorithm A′i for Fi
usingAi, we define auxiliary sets s
K
i (k) and s
L
i (k) which will keep the information
returned by the oracle up to the k-th query posed by a fixed but arbitrary agent
in A \ {i} and agent i. We define sKi (1) = ∅ and s
L
i (1) = ∅.
– WheneverAi poses the k-thK-membership query to agent i ∈ Awith x ∈ Xi
as input, we call the oracle MEMF(A),li with x as input, and if li |=L x, we
add Kjx to the set s
K
i (k) and x to the set s
L
i (k).
– Whenever Ai poses the k-th example query to agent i ∈ A we call the
oracle EQF(A),li with s
L
i (k) as input. The oracle either returns ‘yes’ if s
L
i is
equivalent to li or it returns some counterexample x for li and s
L
i (k). We
add Kjx to s
K
i (k) and x to s
L
i (k) .
MEMF(A),li behaves as it is required by algorithm Ai to learn Fi. If EQF(A),li
returns ‘yes’ then algorithm A′i converts it into ‘you finished’, as expected by
algorithm Ai. We now show that, for all x ∈ Xi such that li |=L x, x is a
(positive) counterexample for li and s
L
i (k) iff li ∧ s
K
i (k) 6|=LK Kjx. By definition
of sKi (k) and s
L
i (k) and since li does not contain LK axioms, for all x ∈ Xi, we
have that li ∧ s
K
i (k) |=LK Kjx iff s
L
i (k) |=L x. By definition and construction
of sLi (k), it follows that li |=L s
L
i (k). So s
L
i (k) 6|=L x iff l
k
i ∧ s
K
i (k) 6|=LK Kjx.
Hence EQF(A),li can simulate EXF(A),lki . By definition of Ai, at every step, the
sum of the sizes of the inputs to queries made by Ai up to that step is bounded
by a polynomial p(|li|, |x|), where li is the target and x ∈ Xi is the largest
counterexample seen so far by Ai. Let s
K
i (k) denote the set s
K
i right after the
k-th example query posed by Ai, and similarly for s
L
i (k). For all k ≥ 0, we
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have that |sLi (k)| ≤ |s
K
i (k)| ≤ p(|li|, |x|). Since all responses to queries are as
required by Ai, if Ai halts after polynomially many polynomial size queries, the
same happens with A′i, which returns a hypothesis s
L
i (k) equivalent to the target
li.
B Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Alternative proof of Lemma 1
We provide an alternative proof of Lemma 1. Reasoning about the satisfiability
of conjunctions of EL literals can be delegated to the reasoning in EL++ [2]. We
define the function τ from the set of EL literals to the set of subsets of EL++
CBox axioms as follows:
τ(A(a)) := {{a} ⊑ A}
τ(¬A(a)) := {{a} ⊓A ⊑ ⊥}
τ(C ⊑ D) := {C ⊑ D}
τ(¬(C ⊑ D)) := {{f} ⊑ C, {f} ⊓D ⊑ ⊥},where f is a fresh individual
τ(r(a, b)) := {{a} ⊑ ∃r.{b}}
τ(¬r(a, b)) := {{a} ⊓ ∃r.{b} ⊑ ⊥}
Now, given a non-empty set L of EL literals, we define:
τ•(L) :=
⋃
l∈L τ(l)
The semantics of the new syntax are: ({a})I = {aI} and (⊥)I = ∅.
An analogous reduction is presented in the proof of [6, Lemma 2.1]. It is
routine to show the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Let L be a non-empty set of EL literals. Then, L is satisfiable
iff τ•(L) is a satisfiable EL++ ontology.
Clearly, τ•(L) can be computed in time polynomial in the size of L. Moreover,
it has been shown in [2] that deciding the satisfiability of an EL++ ontology can
be done in polynomial time. The lemma follows.
Lemma 1. Satisfiability of a conjunction of EL literals is PTime-complete [7].
B.2 Deciding the satisfiability of EL formulas is NP-complete
The fact that the satisfiablity of EL formulas is NP-complete is a consequence of
the fact that one can separate the satisfiability test into two independent tests:
one for the DL dimension and one for the propositional dimension [4,7]. In more
details, the propositional abstraction αprop of an EL formula α is the result of
replacing each EL axiom in ϕ by a propositional variable such that there is a
1 : 1 relationship between the EL axioms a occurring in α and the propositional
variables pa used for the abstraction.
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Given an EL formula α, we say that a propositional modelM of αprop, defined
as the set of variables evaluated to true in the model, is α-consistent if the
following formula is satisfiable
∧
pa∈M
a ∧
∧
pa∈M
¬a
where M is {pa | a is an EL axiom in α} \M. We now formalise the connection
between EL formulas and their propositional abstractions with consistent models,
which is an adaptation of the results obtained for other EL extensions.
Proposition 3. [4, 7] An EL formula α is satisfiable if, and only if, αprop is
satisfiable by an α-consistent model.
To show that EL formulas enjoy the polynomial size model property, we are
going to use the notion of a canonical model for sets of EL axioms [3, 17]. For
completeness of our results and for convenience of the reader, we add a definition
of a canonical model for a set O of EL axioms. We assume w.l.o.g. that the set
O of EL axioms only contains axioms of the form A1 ⊓ A2 ⊑ B, ∃r.A ⊑ B,
A ⊑ ∃r.B, A(a) or r(a, b). In the following we write O |= ∃r.B(a) meaning for
all EL interpretations I, if I satisfies O then aI ∈ (∃r.B)I . Denote with NI(O)
the set {a ∈ NI | a occurs in O}.
Definition 5 (Canonical model). [6][Definition 5.1] Let O be a set of EL
axioms and let ∆IOu = {cA | A ∈ NC(T ) ∪ {⊤}}. The canonical model for O is
∆IO = NI(O) ∪∆IOu ,
aIO = a,
AIO = {a ∈ NI(O) | O |= A(a)} ∪ {cB ∈ ∆IOu | O |= B ⊑ A},
rIO = {(a, b) | r(a, b) ∈ O} ∪ {(a, cB) ∈ NI(O)×∆
IO
u | O |= ∃r.B(a)}∪
{(cA, cB) ∈ ∆IOu ×∆
IO
u | O |= A ⊑ ∃r.B},
for all a ∈ NI, A ∈ NC, r ∈ NR (in fact we only define the canonical model for
concept/role/individual names occurring in O).
Given a concept C and a set O of EL axioms, the canonical model of C and
O is defined in the same way, except that we add the axioms AC ⊑ C, C ⊑ AC
and AC(aC), where AC , aC is a concept and individual name, resp., used to
encode that the extension of C in the model is not empty, and then transform
all axioms in the normal form described above.
We now show that EL formulas enjoy the polynomial size model property.
Lemma 3. EL formulas enjoy the polynomial size model property.
Proof. Let α be an EL formula. By Proposition 3, α is satisfiable if, and only
if, αprop is satisfiable by an α-consistent model. Assume α is satisfiable. Then,
there is an α-consistent model M. We are going to use M to define a model for
α. Since M is an α-consistent model the following formula is satisfiable
ΦM =
∧
pa∈M
a ∧
∧
pa∈M
¬a
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where M is as defined in Section 4.
Denote by IαM the canonical model of the set of EL axioms occurring in α
with pα ∈ M. For each EL axiom a of the form C ⊑ D with pa 6∈ M, let IC,αM
be the canonical model of C and αM. Assume that the domains of IαM and
each such IC,αM are pairwise disjoint. We define Iα as
IαM ∪
⋃
pC⊑D∈M
IC,αM
One can show with an inductive argument that Iα is a model of α, where we use
IC,αM to satisfy the negation of EL axioms of the form C ⊑ D. The fact that
IC,αM indeed violates C ⊑ D follows from the construction of IC,αM , which
only adds implied concepts, and the fact that ΦM is satisfiable, meaning that D
is not implied and therefore the root of IC,αM is not in D
I
C,αM
. The fact that
the negation of EL axioms a of the form A(a) and r(a, b) with a ∈M is satisfied,
follows from the construction of Iα.
This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.
Theorem 8. Deciding the satisfiability of EL formulas is NP-complete.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2
We now extend the result of Theorem 8 to ELK formulas. To show that sat-
isfiability of ELK formulas is NP-complete, we establish that ELK enjoys the
polynomial size model property: if an ELK formula ϕ has a model then it has a
model polynomial in |ϕ|.
Lemma 2. ELK enjoys the polynomial size model property.
Proof. Let I = (W , {Ri}i∈A) be an ELK interpretation and let I ∈ W be an EL
interpretation. Let also ϕ be an ELK formula. Suppose that I, I |= ϕ. Because
of Lemma 3, we can assume w.l.o.g. that each EL interpretation I ∈ W has a
size polynomial in |ϕ|.
Collect in K(ϕ) the ELK axioms of the form Kiα occurring in ϕ. Define
K−(ϕ) = {β ∈ K(ϕ) | I, I 6|= β}.
For every β = Kβ1 . . .Kβkα ∈ K
−(ϕ) (where k ≥ 1, and α is an EL axiom),
we have I, I 6|= β by definition. So there are k (not necessarily distinct) ELK
interpretations Iβ1 , . . . , Iβk inW such that: (1) (I, Iβ1) ∈ Rβ1 ; (2) (Iβi , Iβi+1) ∈
Rβi+1 for 1 ≤ i < k; (3) I, Iβk 6|= α.
Now, define W ′ = {I} ∪ {Iβ1 , . . . , Iβk | β = Kβ1 . . .Kβkα ∈ K
−(ϕ)}. Also,
for each agent i ∈ A, build the relationR′i such that (J ,J
′) ∈ R′i iff J ,J
′ ∈ W ′
and (J ,J ′) ∈ Ri. Finally, let I′ be the ELK interpretation (W ′, {R′i}i∈A).
To conclude the proof, we claim that (i) the size of I′ is polynomial in the
size of ϕ, and (ii) I, I |= ϕ.
To see why (i) holds, observe that by construction,W ′ contains I and at most
one extra interpretation for every modal operator of each element of K−(ϕ).
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Hence, the number of EL interpretations in W ′ is linear in the size of ϕ. By
assumption each I ∈ W is polynomial in |ϕ|. Hence, the size of I′ is polynomial
in the size of ϕ. To establish (ii), it suffices to show that for every ELK axiom β
occurring in ϕ we have I′, I |= β iff I, I |= β. If β is an EL axiom (not in K(ϕ)),
it is immediate. If β = Kβ1 . . .Kβkα ∈ K(ϕ)\K
−(ϕ), we have by definition that
I, I |= Kβ1 . . .Kβkα. Since by construction we have R
′
i ⊆ Ri for every agent
i ∈ A, we also have I′, I |= Kβ1 . . .Kβkα. If β = Kβ1 . . .Kβkα ∈ K
−(ϕ), we
have by definition that I, I 6|= Kβ1 . . .Kβkα. Moreover, there are Iβ1 , . . . , Iβk ∈
W ′ satisfying the properties 1–3 in the construction above. Hence, we also have
I′, I 6|= Kβ1 . . .Kβkα.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 1
For every σ = a1 . . . ak ∈ A∗ we note Rσ = Ra1 ◦. . .◦Rak and Kσ = Ka1 . . .Kak .
The empty sequence is noted ǫ, and we have Rǫ = Id, where Id is the identity
relation, and Kǫω = ω.
The two following lemmas, which are instrumental in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1, are simple consequences of well-known properties of the modal system
S5 [14, p. 58].
Lemma 4. If ϕ♭ is an ELK formula, ϕ and ϕ♭ are equivalent.
Proof. Given an ELK interpretation (W , {Ri}i∈A), we have that Ri is an equiv-
alence relation, for every i ∈ A. In particular it is transitive and reflexive, and we
have Ri ◦Ri = Ri. Thus, for every pointed interpretation (I, I), for every agent
i ∈ A, and for every formula ψ, we have (I, I) |= KiKiψ iff (I, I) |= Kiψ.
Lemma 5. Let (W , {Ri}i∈A) be an ELK interpretation. For all σ ∈ A∗ and
σ′ ∈ A∗, if σ is a subword of σ′ then Rσ ⊆ Rσ′ .
Proof. For every i ∈ A, because Ri is an equivalence relation, and thus reflex-
ive, we have Id ⊆ Ri. We can thus insert arbitrarily additional agents in the
occurence of σ appearing in the right-hand side of Rσ ⊆ Rσ, and obtain the
result.
Proposition 1. A conjunctive ELK formula ϕ is unsatisfiable iff at least one
of the following properties holds:
1. ω0 ∧
∧
{ω | Kσω ∈ ϕ♭} is not EL satisfiable;
2. there is ¬Kσω ∈ ϕ♭ such that ¬ω ∧
∧
{ω′ | Kσ′ω′ ∈ ϕ♭, and σ
is a subword of σ′} is not EL satisfiable.
Proof. Since, by Lemma 4, ϕ♭ and ϕ are equisatisfiable (in fact equivalent), we
prove the property for ϕ♭. For the (⇐) direction, suppose (1) holds. Since Ri
is reflexive for all i ∈ A, every model satisfying ϕ♭ must satisfy ω0 ∧
∧
{ω |
Kσω ∈ ϕ♭}. Since it is not EL satisfiable, there cannot be an ELK interpretation
satisfying ϕ♭ either. Suppose (2) holds. For some ¬Kσω ∈ ϕ♭, we have that ψ =
¬ω∧
∧
{ω′ | Kσ′ω′ ∈ ϕ♭, and σ is a subword of σ′} is not EL satisfiable. Suppose
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towards contradiction that there exist an ELK interpretation I = (W , {Ri}i∈A)
and an EL interpretation J ∈ W such that (I,J ) |= ϕ♭. It means that (I,J ) |=
¬Kσω, that is, there is an EL interpretation J such that (J ,J
′) ∈ Rσ and
(I,J ′) |= ¬ω. From Lemma 5, for every Kσ′ω′ ∈ ϕ♭, if σ is a subword of σ′, then
Rσ ⊆ Rσ′ . Hence, (I,J ′) |= ψ, which is a contradiction because ψ is not EL
satisfiable.
(⇒) Assume that none of (1) and (2) hold. We must show that ϕ♭ is satisfiable.
It suffices to build an ELK interpretation I = (W , {Ri}i∈A) for ϕ♭:
– (Construction ofW)W contains an EL interpretationJ0 satisfying ω0∧
∧
{ω |
Kσω ∈ ϕ♭}. Such an interpretation exists because (1) does not hold. For
each ¬Kσω ∈ ϕ♭, where σ = a1 . . . ak, W also contains an interpretation
J σk satisfying ¬ω ∧
∧
{ω′ | Kσ′ω
′ ∈ ϕ♭, and σ is a subword of σ′}. Such an
interpretation exists because (2) does not hold. Still for each ¬Kσω ∈ ϕ♭,W ,
where σ = a1 . . . ak, for each 1 ≤ i < k, W also contains an interpretation
J σi satisfying
∧
{ω′ | Kσ′ω
′ ∈ ϕ♭, and a1 . . . ai is a subword of σ
′}. Such
interpretations exist because (1) does not hold. W does not contain any
more EL interpretations.
– (Construction of Ri, i ∈ A) For every ¬Kσω ∈ ϕ♭, where σ = a1 . . . ak, for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let (J σi−1,J
σ
i ) ∈ R
′
ai
, where J σ0 = J0. For every i ∈ A, let
Ri be the equivalence closure of R′i.
It is routine to check that I,J0 |= ϕ♭.
